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MINDLESS GUILT: NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTIONS USING THE PUBLIC
WELFARE EXCEPTION
AARON F. KASS*
INTRODUCTION
"[To constitute a crime against human laws, there must be,
first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent
upon such vicious will."' Sir William Blackstone thus believed not
only that both elements were essential, but that the "vicious will"
was the more critical element. 2 In its more modern form, "a
criminal conviction [typically] does require both an act and
criminal or wrongful intent."3 For centuries, it has been the rule
that in order for one to be held responsible for a crime, to be
convicted of that crime, and subsequently to have one's liberty
taken away, the act and intent elements must both be present;
neither alone will suffice.4
Today, however, the modern environmental law and enforce-
ment apparatus has found a way around this traditional
requirement by taking advantage of the far-reaching public
welfare doctrine.5 Under this doctrine, public welfare statutes
"often dispense with the intent requirement imposing, instead,
absolute liability. Absolute liability is imposed in these types of
statutes because the proscribed conduct is subject to stringent
* Mr. Kass received his B.A. in History from Georgetown University in 2002, and
is a 2005 J.D. candidate at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of
William and Mary. He would like to thank his parents, William and Janet Kass,
and the rest of his family and friends for their support throughout law school.
1 State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 880 (Alaska 1997) (construing 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (Univ. Chi. Press
1979) (1769)).
2Id.
' Commonwealth v. CSX Transp., Inc., 653 A.2d 1327, 1331 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995) (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
4See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 21.
5 CSX Transp., Inc., 653 A.2d at 1331 (citation omitted).
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public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's
health or safety."6 "Absolute liability",7 in effect, "means that
liability is imposed without a mens rea."s Under the doctrine of
"absolute liability", a showing of mens rea is not required if "the
offense is not of a character that warrants 'singling out [individual]
wrongdoers for the purpose of punishment or correction"'9 and "the
penalties imposed for the offense are minimal." °
The impact of the public welfare exception on everyday
citizens at the state level is potentially enormous and should not
be ignored by policymakers or the judiciary." Using the public
welfare exception is undesirable as a matter of public policy, par-
ticularly at the state level.' 2 The positive impact the exception may
have on environmental law and its enforcement, by giving
prosecutors an easier route to conviction, is overshadowed by the
negative impact of eliminating the mens rea requirement. 3
Even if, for argument's sake, the public welfare exception did
not offend state public policy, the manner in which it is im-
plemented is faulty. 4 While some states apply the exception
correctly, others do not, ignoring the requirement that, typically,
6Id. at 1331.
7Id.
8 Margaret Shaw, Note, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Re-
levancy of the Public Welfare Doctrine in Determining Culpability, 27 N.E. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CON. 337, 344 (2001).
9 Id. (quoting Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
72 (1933)).
"oShaw, supra note 8, at 344.
11See generally George Flynn, Getting Wasted: Local Officials Say They Are Only
After Compliance and Cleanups; Critics Claim Otherwise, HOUSTON PRESS, Jan.
31, 2002, available at http://www.houstonpress.comissues/2002-01-31/news/
sidebar.html. Flynn discusses the plight of "a man named David who had just
worked his way up from being homeless. He volunteered to help his friend
restore his car after it was flooded in Tropical Storm Allison," and "spilled ...
less than a quart," of "auto fluid" and was charged with a "violation of the used
oil act," a Texas law that could have landed David in prison for possibly twenty
years. Id. David's plight is discussed further in Part V.
12 See infra Part V.
13 See infra Parts II-III.
14 See infra Part III.
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"the penalties imposed for the offense are minimal."15 Although
Minnesota, Ohio, Alabama, and Alaska, for example, apply the
exception correctly with regard to imposing penalties, 6 Wash-
ington, Pennsylvania, and Texas apply the exception incorrectly,
permitting exorbitant penalties and excessive prosecutorial
discretion. 17 Given the discord between the states, the possibility
that the exception will be applied regardless of the penalty's
severity cannot be ignored at the expense of individual citizens.'8
Even though the public welfare exception is implemented in
other areas of law, such as in statutory rape cases, it should not be
permitted in environmental criminal law and enforcement. 9
Making the Earth's environment cleaner and safer is a laudable
goal, but it should not come at the expense of the mens rea
requirement.
This Note will focus entirely on the criminal law aspects of the
public welfare exception and the resulting strict liability imposed.
The tort law concept of strict liability, clearly established in
American jurisprudence," is outside the scope of this Note.
Part I defines the public welfare exception and examines some
of its most basic problems. Part II examines the arguments in
favor of the public welfare exception and attempts to rebut them.
Part III examines how some states and the federal government
apply the exception incorrectly through inordinate penalties. Part
IV examines how some states apply the exception correctly.
Finally, Part V concludes that, given the negative aspects of the
exception and its inconsistent application, it must be eliminated in
the environmental criminal law context.
5 Shaw, supra note 8, at 344; see also infra Part III.
6 See infra Part IV.A-D.
"See infra Part III.A-C.
18 See infra Part V.
9 See infra Part II.C.
20 See GREGOR I. MCGREGOR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 97-98
(1994) (noting that by 1868 Massachusetts held that "an individual who
constructs and maintains an underground vault for manure, located so close to
his neighbor's land that it contaminates his neighbor's well and cellar, is liable
[in tort] without further proof of negligence") (citing Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582
(1868)).
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I. DEFINING THE PUBLIC WELFARE EXCEPTION AND EXAMINING
ITS PROBLEMS
A. The Public Welfare Exception Defined
A "guilty mind" is traditionally required for criminal cul-
pability.2 ' This is because "criminal law . . . focuses on the
defendant's morally culpable mental state."22 Generally, criminal
acts alone are only one aspect of a prosecutor's case and are
insufficient to prove that a defendant committed a particular
crime. Prosecutors must also demonstrate the requisite mens rea.
The public welfare exception vitiates this traditional require-
ment of mens rea.24 The exception, as applied in the environ-
mental criminal law area, gives prosecutors an easier case to
prove. In order to help prosecutors convict environmental
criminals, states allow prosecutors to simply prove the act without
having to prove the defendant's mental state; this is simply
because prosecutors may have a hard time proving the mental
state of those accused of environmental crimes.26 "Often this
statutory crime has been created in order to help the prosecution
cope with a situation wherein intention, knowledge, recklessness
or negligence is hard to prove, making convictions difficult to
obtain unless the fault element is omitted."27
This raises the question of whether convicting individuals and
possibly imposing harsh prison sentences is supposed to be easy.
Simply because the prosecutor may not be able to prove his or
her case does not necessarily mean that the rules should change
21 State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 880 (Alaska 1997) ("The rule that a criminal
offense exists at the intersection of a guilty act and guilty mind is commonly
viewed as the bedrock of criminal common law.").22 Shaw, supra note 8, at 341.
23 See Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 880.24 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5 (4th ed. 2003).21 See id.26 See id.
27 Id.
520
MINDLESS GUILT
to make it easier, even if the laudable goal is to protect the
environment.2" Although eliminating the mens rea requirement
is an enticing proposition for proponents of tougher environ-
mental protection, the notion must be examined with greater
scrutiny.
The law, even without the public welfare exception, provides
for prosecutorial flexibility with various "gradations in mental
states"29 corresponding to various degrees of punishment. ° In the
typical case, though, prosecutors still must prove at least one of
these mental states in order to prevail. "[Niow [state law]
recognizes limited exceptions to a rule once characterized as
admitting no compromise."3 1
B. Uses and Rationale for the Public Welfare Exception
The public welfare exception is used in many different capa-
cities to protect the environment on the state level.32 It is used to
regulate waste transportation,33 building size, 4 oil discharge,35
commercial fishing,36 and hunting.3 7 These are just a few of the
many applications of the public welfare exception in state
environmental prosecutions. The exception is wide-ranging,
encompassing a multitude of activities in jurisdictions across the
United States.38
2 See infra Part V.
29United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).30 Id.
31Id.
32See infra Parts III-IV.33See Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc., 830 A.2d 621 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
"
4See State v. Arkell, 657 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
"
5See State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 880 (Alaska 1997); Flynn, supra note 11.
36See Phillips v. State, 771 So.2d 1061 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Mertens,
64 P.3d 633 (Wash. 2003).37 See State v. Bowersmith, No. 14-02-02, 2002 WL 1434057, at *3 (Ohio App. 3
Dist. June 25, 2002).31 See infra Parts III-IV.
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The rationale behind the exception is that certain social
"controls" must be maintained, a goal that can be satisfied by
imposing criminal sanctions." Specifically,
[a] violation of a public-welfare statute impairs the
efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social
order as presently constituted .... [Wihatever the
intent of the violator, the injury is the same....
Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a
matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necess-
ary element.4"
This rationale was primarily the State's "response to the ...
industrial revolution."41 At that time, "[tlhe increased number of
people exposed to injury due to new technologies, traffic, the
congestion of cities, the overcrowding of quarters, and the wide
distribution of goods.., led to increasingly numerous and detailed
regulations .... ."" Given the consequences of the industrial
revolution and its impact on the environment, it is not surprising
that many states adopted environmental laws and that many of
these laws include criminal public welfare components.43
The impact of the public welfare exception is quite dramatic.
Despite the good faith efforts of some defendants to obey the law,
39Arkell, 657 N.W.2d at 888.40Id.
41 Kelly A. Swanson, Case Notes, Recent Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme
Court: Criminal Law: Mens Rea Alive and Well: Limiting Public Welfare
Offenses-In Re C.R.M., 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2002). See also
Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1952) (noting that the
industrial revolution led to certain "dangers" and, as a result, "[siuch dangers
have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which
heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries," and "[wihile
many of these duties are sanctioned by a more strict civil liability, lawmakers,
whether wisely or not, have sought to make such regulations more effective by
invoking criminal sanctions").42 Swanson, supra note 41, at 1267-68.43 See generally id. For example, the "new technologies" and "traffic" mentioned
above would require oil to run, along with detailed plans for waste disposal. Both
oil and waste disposal are the subjects of two state environmental laws which
use the public welfare exception, which are discussed infra in Part III.
522
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a court will ignore such efforts and inflict punishment if the public
welfare exception applies." However, this is at odds with the
general purpose of criminal law, which is simply to protect society
from "bad people."45 By eliminating the mens rea requirement, and
allowing criminal punishment regardless of attempts to comply
with the law, it is unlikely that society will only punish "bad
people."46 For a number of reasons, this is an unacceptable
consequence.47
One reason is that the public welfare exception goes against
the grain of history. "Western civilized nations have long looked to
the wrongdoer's mind to determine both the propriety and the
grading of punishment.... This is the criminal law's mantra."48
Examining "the wrongdoer's mind"49 is a requirement as old as the
ancient Romans and Greeks.5" "In his dialogues in Laws, Plato
attempt[ed] to construct an ideal criminal code.... [and created a]
gradation of crimes based upon levels of intent."5 Plato, although
not an absolute authority, should at least be recognized as highly
persuasive through his historical contributions to the field of
philosophy.
4See Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc., 830 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)
(discussing a waste transportation statute under which a "bonafide effort" to
"ensure compliance with the statute and its regulations" is irrelevant because
"you either are in compliance or not. And you're responsible at all times to be in
compliance with that regulation.") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). See also State v. Arkell, 657 N.W.2d 883, 885 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(discussing a building code statute that conferred liability upon the defendant
even though he reported problems to the project managers, who neglected to
address the problems).
4 5 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.5.
4 6 Id.
4 7See generally Flynn, supra note 11 and accompanying text (providing a clear
example of the possible negative impacts of a public welfare statute on a
homeless man trying to help his friend fix his car).41United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485,489-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).49Id. at 489.
"oSee id. at 490.
5 11d. (quoting A.E. Taylor, Introduction, in PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO, xlix-1
(A.E. Taylor trans., 1934)). "What the legislator has to ask himself is whether
the agent of the beneficial or detrimental act is acting with a rightful spirit and
in a rightful manner." Id. at 490.
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C. Limitations of the Public Welfare Exception
The public welfare exception does not cover all offenses.
Rather, it applies only to a particular sort of offense, determined
by various factors such as "the extent to which a strict liability
reading of the statute would encompass seemingly entirely
innocent conduct.., the harshness of the penalty... [and] the
seriousness of the harm to the public."52 A major problem is that
these factors are very fluid and open to a large degree of
interpretation.53 They are also quite broad and do not offer much
definitive guidance to courts.54
Another factor often used to differentiate public welfare
crimes from other crimes is that public welfare crimes are
generally considered "mala prohibita" instead of "mala in se."55
Crimes which are "malaprohibita" are "not patently immoral," but
are "wrong because [they are] ... prohibited.... [When conduct
is penalized only because of a legislative mandate, then the na-
ture of the proscription derives solely from that mandate."" Crimes
categorized as "mala in se" are generally "[clommon law crimes,
which by their nature are wrongful, requir[ing] scienter because
moral culpability is inherent to the offense. " "
To distinguish the two concepts, "mala prohibita" crimes are
deemed wrong through legislative decree, whereas "mala in se"
crimes are wrong "by their nature" because they are naturally
immoral.5" It is therefore acceptable to have no mens rea
52 State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978, 983 (Wash. 1996) (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.8, at 341-44 (1986)).53 Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme
Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859,902 (1999)
("[No satisfactory criterion is available to identify a given offense as 'regulatory'
or 'public welfare."').
54 Id.
"State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 882 (Alaska 1997).
56 Id.
57 Id.
"See id.
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requirement for the former, because the state is not actually
declaring them morally wrong, but wrong as a matter of
necessity.59 Because "mala prohibita" crimes are not prohibited
because they are morally wrong, it is not necessary to prove the
actor had a specific, immoral state of mind; it is only necessary to
prove that the act occurred.60 A problem arises with this dis-
tinction, however, because it is possible that a particular crime
may be characterized as both "mala in se" and "mala prohibita."6 '
Given the impact of the public welfare exception, which
alleviates one element a prosecutor bears the burden of proving,
one must ask why a more concrete definition of public welfare
crimes cannot be established, and why a more exact balance
cannot be achieved. "Ideally, this would include only 'a specialized
type of regulatory offense involving a social injury so direct and
widespread[,] and a penalty so light that in such exceptional cases
courts could safely override the interests of innocent individual
defendants and punish without proof of any guilty intent."'62 The
problem is that legislatures and courts, in trying to achieve this
"ideal,"63 may in fact settle for quite less and allow that ideal to fall
by the wayside.'
59See id.
60 See id.
61State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875,882 (Alaska 1997); see also Shaw, supra note
8, at 345.
[M]ost crimes have both malum in se and malum prohibitum
qualities. For example, if a person discharges a pollutant into a
sewer system without a permit, he or she is in violation of a
regulatory provision of the CWA [Clean Water Act]. This is
clearly a malum prohibitum crime. However, depending on the
risk associated with the discharge and society's perception of the
moral wrong involved with the act, the violation may also be a
malum in se crime.
Id. (citation omitted).
62 Shaw, supra note 8, at 344 (quoting Sayre, supra note 9, at 68).
63See Sayre, supra note 9, at 68.64 See infra Part III.
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D. The Penalty Aspect in Detail
Although the factors mentioned above can be confusing, the
penalty is at least quantifiable. Courts in various states6 5 have not
only had a hard time interpreting the requirement that "penalties
imposed for the offense are minimal,"66 but seemingly ignore the
requirement and impose the public welfare exception regardless of
the penalty.67
For example, in State v. Arkell,6 s a Minnesota court ruled that
the defendant was guilty of violating a state building code and
sentenced him to ten days in jail.69 This was a relatively "minimal"
consequence.7 ° A contrasting example is State v. Mertens, where a
Washington court ruled that the defendant was guilty of violating
a state commercial fishing statute, which set the "maximum
confinement.., at five years and the maximum fine at $10,000."'l
Compared to the penalty in Arkell, this was not a "minimal
consequence." Because both of these crimes were categorized as
public welfare offenses,73 but the penalties for each were so
different (ten days versus five years), these cases illustrate the
inconsistency with which the public welfare exception is applied
between different states. Other examples depicting the different
interpretations of the public welfare exception are discussed later
in this Note.74
Advocates of the public welfare exception may argue that even
if the potential penalties are higher than those normally accepted
6 See infra Part III.66Shaw, supra note 8, at 344.
67 See infra Part III.
68657 N.W.2d 883, 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). In fact, on appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, invalidating the ruling
altogether and stating that the public welfare exception should not have been
invoked at all. State v. Arkell, 627 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 2003).69Arkell, 657 N.W.2d at 886.70 Shaw, supra note 8, at 344.
71 State v. Mertens, 64 P.3d 633, 637 (Wash. 2003).
72 Shaw, supra note 8, at 344.
71See Arkell, 657 N.W.2d at 887-88. See also Mertens, 64 P.3d at 637.
71 See infra Parts III-IV.
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for the application of the exception, as in Mertens, judges will fix
the problem at sentencing and impose a more reasonable penalty.75
In all criminal prosecutions, it is possible that a particular judge
will not sentence a particular defendant to the maximum
applicable penalty. In the public welfare area, it is also possible
that a particular judge will fix the "problem" and only sentence the
defendant to a small penalty. The grace of the judge is not,
however, the only protection upon which a defendant should have
to rely.76 This cannot be the solution to inordinate penalties
because it lacks consistency, long-term effect, and depends solely
upon the will of individual judges.77
Advocates of the public welfare exception may also argue that
prosecutors will help to fix the problem by using their "discretion"
during sentencing. 7 As was the case with judges, prosecutorial
discretion cannot, however, be the ultimate safeguard against
unjust imprisonment upon which a defendant should have to rely.
7 5 MARY CLIFFORD, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT, POLICY, AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 240 (1998). In a particular environmental criminal prosecution,
"[a]lthough the plant manager faced up to nine years in jail and a fine of
$65,000, the judge fined him $5,000 and sentenced him to two years' probation."
Id. (citations omitted).
76 But see Flynn, supra note 11. The judge did in fact exercise a large deal of
discretion for the benefit of the defendant. However, there still remains the
question of whether the defendant should have had to rely upon such discretion.
" See generally Richard Frase, Panel Remarks: Is Guided Discretion Sufficient?
Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LouIs L.J. 425, 431 (2000). The
original goals of sentencing guidelines were "to reduce sentencing discretion and
its resulting disparities" because "[u]nregulated discretion ... produced unjust
disparities in the treatment of equally serious cases." Id. Frase also noted that
"[situdies were done which showed that when you gave a sentencing file to a
group ofjudges they proposed very different sentences; it was not just that 'each
case is different."' Id.7 8 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.5 (noting that "prosecuting officials [will use] ...
their broad discretion to prosecute or not to prosecute" when faced with decisions
relating to the public welfare exception). See MCGREGOR, supra note 20, at 106.
"Although many environmental statutes support the theory of strict liability,
violations which are truly accidental may not support criminal prosecution....
The prosecutor always will consider the violator's motive." Id.
2005] 527
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The Model Penal Code provides a clear solution:
[T] he Model Penal Code would permit strict liability
only for "offenses which constitute violations";79
violations under the Code are not crimes, may be
punished only by a fine, forfeiture or other civil
penalty, and may not give rise to any disability or
legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal
offense. 0
States that are currently ignoring the penalty requirement of the
public welfare exception should adopt the Model Penal Code view,
and, if they decline to do so, should disregard the public welfare
exception entirely.8'
E. Long Term Impacts: Insurance and the Environment
Use of the public welfare exception has both individual82 and
societal consequences. The first societal consequence is the poten-
tial for rising insurance premiums.83 Insurance companies feel the
impact of strict liability, which "requir[es] that insureds pay
premiums that are proportional to the risks of loss those
participants bring with them."84 It is currently an issue in the
European Union, which is considering legislation that would
increase the use of strict liability theories in prosecuting
environmental crimes in Europe. The Financial Times reported
79 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.5(c) (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1)(a)
(1985)).
8
"Id. § 5.5(c) (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (2003)).
81But see id. § 5.5(c). "Reforms along these lines have seldom been adopted." Id.82 This Note has already discussed the individual consequences: imprisonment
without the prosecution proving mens rea and imprisonment without regard to
the penalty. See supra Parts I.A, I.D.
" See Vanessa Houlder, No Common Ground on Pollution, Green Groups and
Industry Lobbyists Are At Loggerheads Over a Proposed EU Directive on
Environmental Liability, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at 17.
'James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV.
377, 392 (2002).85See Houlder, supra note 83, at 17.
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"unease among insurers, which think that the directive could cause
chaos by insisting on mandatory environmental insurance." 6
The proposed legislation would allow prosecution on a strict
liability basis and, as a consequence, require "compulsory insu-
rance or a dedicated fund"" to make sure that those convicted
could not simply plead insolvency. The impact on individual
citizens could be potentially far-reaching: "[i]nsurers acknowledge
that many companies-mostly small and medium-sized busi-
nesses-could be faced with very high premiums or even find it
impossible to get insurance at all." 8
Four months later, in March 2003, this issue was still "gaining
ground" 9 in the European Union. Although at the time there was
"no [longer any] intention of introducing compulsory insurance for
small businesses,"9 ° the effects of strict liability could not be
ignored. Even without mandatory insurance for small companies,
there was still a significant possibility that strict liability penalties
would cause "increases in employers' liability premiums."'" Such
increases in liability insurance have the potential to hinder
employers' ability to hire more employees, forcing them instead to
pay off their rising insurance premiums.92
Although the issue of rising insurance premiums is not a
direct effect of the public welfare exception on the individual, its
indirect impact cannot be understated. Even if an individual
employee is not prosecuted under this proposed European Union
legislation, employers may be forced to forego hiring in order to
pay their rising insurance premiums, which would cause higher
unemployment.9 3
861d.
8 7
1d.
8 8 Id.89Ronald Gribben, Green Cover Bids Gain Ground. Euro-MPs Are Warming To
the Principle of Environmental Insurance, But Small Companies Should Escape,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 31, 2003, at 33.
9 0 Id.
9 1 1d.
92 See id.
93See Gribben, supra note 89; Houlder, supra note 83.
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Although "[tihe general rule is that insuring against criminal
liability is against public policy, therefore insurance policies that
attempt to do so are void and unenforceable.., there are limited
exceptions to this public policy."94 Specifically, insurance can be
obtained to protect "against strict liability and negligent violations
of criminal law."95 Although this Note is primarily concerned with
the impact of strict liability on environmental criminal penalties,
the indirect impact that strict liability crimes have on insurance
premiums should not be ignored.
The second potential societal consequence of the public welfare
exception, though also an indirect effect, is the potential harm to
the environment.96 "A key factor in the quality of environmental
management is the quality of the people in control of its manage-
ment .... The possibility of criminal sanctions for permit vio-
lations, without any proof that the defendant knew of the violation,
deters the most capable people from assuming these extremely
important positions."97 Because managers of industries impacted
by environmental laws are held liable regardless of steps taken to
correct the problem, with no regard to their state of mind, it is
possible that they will seek other employment, leaving less
qualified individuals in charge.9"
This idea may be better understood with an analogy to cor-
porate law. Directors may be held individually liable to share-
holders in derivative suits for breaching the duty of care but can
be protected from liability through exculpatory clauses. 99 Today,
" Richard H. Hobbie III, A Sea Chest for Sea Lawyers: Coverage of Environ-
mental Problems, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1557, 1562 (2001).
9 5
Id.
96 Kepten D. Carmichael, Note, Strict Liability for Environmental Violations: A
Need for Judicial Restraint, 71 IND. L.J. 729, 751-52 (1996).
9 7
Id.
9 8 1d.
" 8 Del. Laws 102(b)(7). See generally RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW GCL-I-27, § 102.15 (2003-1 Supp.).
"Since insurance for directors' liability had become more expensive and
sometimes unavailable, a concern developed with respect to the ability of
corporations to continue to attract and retain qualified directors." Id. Rodman
further notes that
530
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these exculpatory clauses are necessary parts of a corporation's
Articles of Incorporation, because the most "qualified directors"
demand such protections.100 Although exculpatory clauses seem to
make directors less likely to care about corporate governance
because they will not be liable even if they breach a duty owed to
the corporation, these clauses are nevertheless essential in order
to make the most "qualified directors" willing to lead the
corporation in the first place. 1 1 By analogy, environmental mana-
gers must be protected to a certain extent, at least requiring the
state to prove the traditional element of mens rea, otherwise those
managers may seek other employment. 1 2 Although the reasoning
behind the public welfare exception is to make individuals more
responsible environmental actors, an unintended consequence is
that it may actually make managers with years of experience, who
are the least likely to commit a violation, less likely to remain
environmental managers.
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE EXCEPTION AND THEIR
WEAKNESSES
Three prevalent arguments exist to support the use of the
public welfare exception: first, the ease with which prosecutors can
convict causes individual actors to behave more responsibly;
10 3
second, individuals should have known their behavior was subject
[i]n response to this problem, the Delaware legislature decided
that Delaware corporations should be authorized to include
provisions in their certificates of incorporation limiting or eli-
minating the personal liabilities of directors for breach of the
fiduciary duty of care. Liability may not be so limited for breach
of the duty of loyalty, failure to act in good faith, [or] intentional
misconduct ....
Id. This limitation on section 102(b)(7) is the key. From this quote, one can
surmise that the Delaware legislature recognizes that although intentional
misconduct may lead to liability, mere negligence should not.
100Id.
101 See id.
10 2 See Carmichael, supra note 96, at 751-52.
103 See infra Part II.A.
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to stringent regulation; °4 third, the public welfare exception is
used in many other areas of the law and environmental law cases
should be treated no differently. °5 While each of these arguments
is strong, each also possesses critical weaknesses which must be
addressed.
A. The Exception Helps the Environment
Public welfare exception proponents may argue that the public
policy of protecting the environment is simply more important
than the negative aspects of eliminating the mens rea require-
ment. Advocates of the exception need only cite the advice of
environmental lawyers to environmental actors, which cautions
that greater care be given in the strict liability context."0 ' Attorney
Paul Berning, in a construction industry newsletter, cautions
"[businesspeople, beware.... [M]anagers can be sentenced to jail
time simply for company violations that occurred on their
watches.""' One of the stated purposes of Berning's article is to
"offer some practical advice for avoiding liability and minimizing
the impact of a violation." 0 8 This is pertinent advice for individuals
in the construction industry because "the trend is to liberally
construe statutes so that they are found to concern the 'public
welfare.' Thus, courts can, and likely will, interpret the criminal
provisions of these environmental laws to impose strict liability on
executives and managers."'0 9 Berning offers a multitude of "ways
to avoid or minimize liability.""0 His warning exemplifies the
1 04 See infra Part II.B.
'
05 See infra Part II.C.
106 Paul W. Berning, How Managers Face Criminal Penalties Under Public
Protection Laws, Sept. 11, 2000, at http://www.constructionweblinks.com/
Resources/Industry.ReportsNewsletters/Septl2000/managers-penalties.
htm.
108 Id.
1091Id.
110 Id. (noting that corporations should create compliance programs where
"overall responsibility" is given to a "specific, high-ranking individual with a
significant policy role in the company," should "[c]ommunicate the company's
conduct code and its compliance program to all employees and anyone who acts
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argument that the public welfare exception has caused environ-
mental actors to behave in a more environmentally friendly
manner, albeit in order to avoid liability. The exception's deterrent
effect on industry must be recognized as promoting positive
environmental outcomes.
Although this is a strong argument, it contains two major
fallacies. First, while public policy in favor of the exception is
strong, one cannot ignore the strong policy in favor of convicting
only culpable individuals."' These policy goals must be balanced;
neither policy can clearly be favored over the other. Second, it is
possible that "deter[ing] the most capable people from assuming
these extremely important positions" actually harms the en-
vironment."' Although there are strong deterrent effects of these
regulations, there are also competing factors that policy-makers
must not ignore.
B. Individuals Should Have Known About the Regulations
Proponents of the public welfare exception also argue "that
public-welfare statutes impose liability for the 'type of conduct
that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent
public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's
health or safety.""' 3 The argument is misleading, however, be-
cause what it really advocates, by stating that the actor "should
know" that his acts are wrong and thus should be liable, is
negligence and not strict liability."4
Negligence should not be the rationale for strict liability, but
instead should offer one of the "[ailternatives to [sitrict [I]ia-
bility."1 5 "There is a 'half-way house': criminal liability predicated
upon negligence .... [Tihe idea of criminal responsibility based
on the company's behalf," and should "[ejnforce the program consistently by
promptly and thoroughly investigating any allegations of company wrongdoing
and by swiftly disciplining any employees involved").
111 See supra Part I.
"
2 Carmichael, supra note 96, at 751-52.
113 State v. Arkell, 657 N.W.2d 883, 887-88 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985)).
14 See LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.5(d).
115Id.
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upon the actor's failure to act as carefully as he should affords an
important and largely unutilized means for avoiding the tyranny
of strict liability in the criminal law."" 6 If one of the rationales for
the public welfare exception is that the defendant should know of
the regulations, then this does not mean the mens rea requirement
should be eliminated in favor of strict liability, only that the
appropriate mens rea standard should be negligence.
C. The Public Welfare Exception is Used Elsewhere, So Why Not
for Environmental Crimes?
Proponents of the public welfare exception may also argue that
if it is applicable in other areas of the law, environmental law
should not be excluded. The exception is used in "pure food and
drug acts, speeding ordinances, building regulations, and child
labor, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation.""7 It is also
used in the statutory rape context."' "[D]ue to the seriousness of
[statutory rape], [I] egislatures wrote laws that irrespective of the
subjective intent of the actor, he (or she) would be guilty of an
offense with significant criminal penalties.""9 However, it is not
necessarily correct that the public welfare exception should be
applied in these areas of the law either, because the exception does
not distinguish the environment from other areas of the law. 2 °
However, some state legislatures support the proposition that
the public welfare exception must be curbed. They "take a some-
what narrower view of what is allowed under their state consti-
tutions. Thus, some authority is to be found to the effect that a
strict-liability criminal statute is unconstitutional if... the statute
carries a substantial penalty of imprisonment .... ,,21 Alaska's
116 Herbert Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 107, 109-10 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1962)
117 Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc., 830 A.2d 621,626-27 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
11 Jonathan Snyder, Back to Reality: What "Knowingly" Really Means and the
Inherently Subjective Nature of the Mental State Requirement in Environmental
Criminal Law, 8 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POLWY REV. 1, 8 (2001).
119M.
120 See supra Part I.
121 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.5(c), at 278-79 (citing Hentzer v. State, 613 P.2d
821 (Alaska 1980)).
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courts, for instance, are careful to apply the public welfare
exception in either environmental or non-environmental areas. 
122
Alaska judges are cautious when "the penalty for violating... is
not small,"123 because "[s]uch a sentence must carry with it
considerable societal opprobrium."124 Alaska recognizes that the
public welfare exception must be applied with caution whenever
stiff criminal penalties are possible, whether in the environ-
mental'2 5 or non-environmental 126 area.
In Alaska, this caution even extends to statutory rape charges.
In State v. Guest, 127 the court noted its belief "that the charge of
statutory rape is legally unsupportable ... unless a defense of
reasonable mistake of age is allowed.... When that opportunity
is foreclosed the result is strict criminal liability."12 Alaska is
essentially requiring, in circular fashion, a mens rea of negligence,
demanding proof that the defendant did not act as a "reasonable"
129
person would have acted in the same situation.
Proponents of the public welfare exception may argue that
because it is used in other areas of the law without extensive
criticism, such as statutory rape, environmental law should be no
different. However, as Guest illustrates, this is not always true; the
public welfare exception is not summarily used in other areas of
the law without criticism, nor should it be.
The public welfare exception is applied in numerous states for
a variety of environmental offenses. Although Alaska treats the
exception with caution, other states are not so careful. 3 '
122 See Hentzer v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 826-27 (Alaska 1980). The court refused
to allow the public welfare exception to apply in this securities fraud case
"because the penalty for [a violation] ... [was] not small.... [The defendant]
could have been sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment twenty years,"
and although he was only sentenced to one year, it could have become five years
had he violated a condition of his probation. Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 827.
125 See infra Part IV.126 See id.
127 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
12 8Id. at 838-39.
129 Id.
3
' See infra Part III.
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III. INCORRECT APPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE
EXCEPTION
A. Washington
The State of Washington applies the public welfare exception
incorrectly, disregarding the penalty limitations central to the
exception. In State v. Mertens,'3' the defendant was charged with
"commercial fishing without a license."'32 The court concluded that
strict liability was applicable "[b] ecause the prosecutor could prove
all of the elements of the crime based on conduct alone." 33 The
court, attempting to justify the "harshness of the penalty," 34 noted
that it had "allowed characterization as a strict liability crime even
where the potential punishment included a five-year maximum
sentence."'3 5 Although, academically, five years may seem like a
relatively short amount of time compared to a life sentence in
prison, it is potentially over 1800 days for a defendant to spend
incarcerated without the prosecution ever having to prove mens
rea.136
The court rationalized that "[t]he statute at issue here only
criminalized possession of more than three times the daily limit of
shellfish, thereby minimizing the possibility that entirely innocent
conduct will be punished."137 Certainly, Washington was trying to
avoid punishing innocent conduct by using this standard.138 The
inference drawn from this standard, however, is troubling. If one
was actually in possession of that much shellfish, then one must
have had the requisite intent to break the law, or at least did so
knowingly or recklessly. If this is the case, then there is no reason
13164 P.3d 633 (Wash. 2003).
132 id.
133 Id. at 636.134 Id. at 637.
1351d.
136 This length of imprisonment is calculated by multiplying the number of days
in a year, 365, by five.
13 7Mertens, 64 P.3d at 637 (emphasis in original).
13 8 Id.
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why the state should not require the prosecution to prove it as an
element of the crime as it must in other criminal prosecutions.
The court offered the following response. "[I]t is reasonable to
conclude that the legislature recognized that proving a defendant's
commercial intent could be extremely difficult . . Thus, we
conclude that the legislature intended commercial fishing without
a license to be a strict liability crime."139 The problem with this
rationale, however, is that carrying an amount of shellfish so far
over the legal limit could be used by the prosecution as
circumstantial evidence of a defendant's state of mind and intent
regardless. Although not requiring the prosecution to prove a
defendant's state of mind makes conviction easier, this prose-
cutorial crutch should not be necessary based on the rationale for
this statute.
Washington permits the public welfare exception's application
in situations where the penalties are potentially high; its Supreme
Court's rationale is laudable, but not entirely consistent. 4 ° Wash-
ington continues to apply the public welfare exception incorrectly
and is a prime example of its potentially harmful application.'
B. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania provides another example of the problem with
the public welfare exception. In Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc.,
42
the defendant was charged with "allowing solid waste to be
transported in equipment which did not bear the type of waste
being hauled,"4 3 in direct violation of a Pennsylvania solid waste
transportation statute.'" The court found that under this statute
13 9 1d *
14oId.
141 See id.
142 830 A.2d 621 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
14 3 Id. at 623.
144Compare 25 PA. CODE. § 285.218 (2003), with 18 PA. CODE § 2501 (2003). "[A]
vehicle or conveyance that is ordinarily or primarily used for the transportation
of solid waste shall bear a sign . . . ." 25 PA. CODE. § 285.218 (2003). Section
285.218 is a solid waste disposal statute that requires no showing of a
defendant's state of mind. Id. See also 18 PA. CODE. § 2501 (2003). "A person is
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"the fact that the driver has failed here does not excuse the owner,
despite the owner's bonafide efforts to comply with the regulation.
... [This case do [es] not require criminal intent ... you either are
in compliance or not."'45 Sanico illustrates the basic problem with
the public welfare exception. Giving no credit to recognized
"bonafide efforts" 14 6 is substantively inconsistent with one of the
major rationales for the public welfare exception: the prosecution
would have a difficult task in proving a truly guilty defendant's
state of mind.4 7 In this case, given the defendant's attempts to
comply, he would not have had a culpable state of mind in the first
place.
Pennsylvania, though not necessarily applying the penalty
aspect incorrectly, has ruled against defendants such as Sanico
where one of the most basic rationales for the exception is simply
not present. Although it was not necessarily inconsistent with any
of the specific limiting factors,' 48 the court in Sanico was inconsis-
tent with the overall purpose and direction of the exception.
C. Texas
Texas disregards the penalty factor of the exception in certain
instances.149 A violation of Texas oil pollution laws can potentially
carry a prison sentence of up to twenty years absent any showing
of a defendant's state of mind. 50 For example, David, a homeless
man who "volunteered to help a friend restore his car after it
was flooded in Tropical Storm Allison," was arrested after
"spill [ing] . . . less than a quart [of transmission fluid] . "151 "The
guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently causes the death of another human being." Id. Section 2501 is a
murder statute that requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant
committed the act and had a particular state of mind. Id.
145Sanico, 830 A.2d at 624.
146Id.
147 See LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.5.
148 See supra Part I.
149 See Flynn, supra note 11.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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head of the pollution prosecution team" in the jurisdiction where
David was arrested stated in response to complaints about the
prosecution "that his office prosecutes more than 600 cases yearly,
so there are bound to be isolated gripes."152 A potential twenty-year
prison sentence is not a light penalty, nor should it be charac-
terized as an "isolated gripe." 53 Although the judge sentenced
David to a much lighter sentence,' there is no guarantee that a
different judge would have solved the public welfare exception
problem in the same manner. 5
Texas, at least in this instance, ignored the penalty restriction
for the public welfare exception. The defendant only had the grace
of the trial judge to thank, and that should not be the situation for
other defendants when courts apply the public welfare exception
in Texas. 156
D. Federal Government View
The constitutionality of high penalties for public welfare
violations has not been an issue since the U.S. Supreme Court
"backed off of going all the way to outlawing felony public welfare
offenses" in the recent gun control case of Staples v. United
States.157 "[Wie need not adopt such a definitive rule of con-
struction to decide this case .... Instead, we note only that.., a
severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress
did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement."' The
Supreme Court, despite frowning upon public welfare offenses with
high penalties, declined to make a bright line rule invalidating
them. This was despite the fact that, for some critics, "since
violations of environmental criminal provisions constitute felo-
nies, the absence of a culpability requirement is improper. ...
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 Id. (noting that the judge sentenced defendant to a $1,000 fine).
155 See supra Part I.D.
156 See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 11.
157 Snyder, supra note 118, at 13.
118 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994).
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[Piroponents point out that the original penalties contemplated by
the doctrine were only misdemeanors." 59 On the federal level,
despite its own misgivings, the Supreme Court has declined to
actually rule felony penalties unconstitutional, 60 leading to cases
such as United States v. Good, 6' which involved violations of
"Forest Service regulations."
162
In Good, the court noted that "the penalty of not more than 6
months imprisonment and not more than a $500 fine is relatively
small; convictions for violating regulations against mechanical
mining and constructing an unapproved structure do not gravely
besmirch Mr. Good's reputation.... "163 This statement exemplifies
the overarching problem with the use of the public welfare
exception: judges, who interpret the statutes that use the
exception, are disregarding the penalty limitation that "penalties
imposed for the offense are minimal. " " This may not be the
judges' fault, but may instead be caused by a lack of clear defi-
nition because "no satisfactory criterion is available to identify a
given offense as 'regulatory' or 'public welfare." 65
For example, it is unclear what exactly "besmirch Mr. Good's
reputation"'66 means. To claim that six months in jail, or even a
criminal conviction with such an accompanying possible sentence,
is not damaging to one's reputation is very naive.'67 For instance,
it is possible that potential customers and colleagues will not wish
to do business with a convicted criminal. The current trend is
towards increasing the penalties for environmental crimes. "In
1995, for example, environmental enforcement resulted in $23.2
" Snyder, supra note 118, at 12.
160 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 618.
161257 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (D. Colo. 2003).
162 Id. at 1318 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 261.9(a) (2003) (listing general prohibitions,
including "[diamaging any natural feature of other property of the United
States")).163 Id. at 1318.
164 Shaw, supra note 8, at 344. Although this is a federal case using the public
welfare exception, it is illustrative of the problems on the state level.165 Singer & Husak, supra note 53, at 902.
16 Good, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
16 7 See id. at 1318.
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million in criminal fines and 74 years of prison time. In 1999, just
four years later, criminal fines tripled to $61.6 million, and courts
handed down 208 years of prison time. ..."' Given this upward
trend, with the public welfare exception being one of a prose-
cution's easiest tools of enforcement, environmental policy-makers
simply cannot afford to ignore when and how the exception is used
to convict defendants. Although 208 years may be an objectively
small number given the population of the United States, it is a
significantly substantial increase from four years earlier, when
seventy-four years of prison time was given, and this total should
not be discounted.1
69
Although some of the states discussed in this Note apply the
exception incorrectly, 7 ° it is important to recognize that there are
states that do apply the exception correctly. 7' This Note's primary
contention is that the public welfare exception should be elimi-
nated, given its negative aspects. If the exception is not eliminated,
the next best solution is embraced by the states discussed in Part
IV, which at least apply the exception correctly.
IV. CORRECT APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCEPTION
A. Minnesota
In the recent case of State v. Arkell,'72 the defendant was
charged with violations of a state building code, for which he was
sentenced to ten days in jail.'73 In deciding whether the public
welfare exception was appropriate in the case, the court
emphasized that the penalty was "light."'74 The court concluded
"' Berning, supra note 106.
169 Id.
1 0 See supra Part III.
171 See infra Part IV.
172 657 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
173 Id. at 886.
174Id. at 888. "Strict-liability statutes are generally disfavored, but the supreme
court has inferred mens rea in statutes that are silent on the subject only when
the statutes provide felony or gross-misdemeanor penalties." Id. (internal
citations omitted). Here the penalty was small, not falling within the range of
a "felony or gross-misdemeanor." Id.
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that "[blecause a violation . . . is a misdemeanor, the policy
disfavoring strict-liability statutes is not implicated." 17 5 The court
affirmed the defendant's conviction because the penalty limitations
on the public welfare exception were met. 176 Although Minnesota
used the public welfare exception, at least it attempted to apply
the exception correctly. 177 On an even more positive note, recently
Arkell made its way to the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the
"light" ten day sentence was reversed altogether, with the Court
holding that the public welfare exception should not have been
used at all. 7 '
B. Ohio
In another recent case, State v. Bowersmith, 179 the defendant
was convicted of "failing to carry and display a special deer permit
while hunting upon the lands of another."' The court applied
"strict liability"' and the defendant was fined just seventy-five
dollars.'82 This is a good example of an appropriate penalty.
Aside from a cautious approach regarding penalties, Ohio also
displays an overall cautiousness in the use of strict liability
through its statutory scheme: when a statute "plainly indicates a
purpose to impose strict criminal liability ... then culpability is
not required .... [However,] [w]hen the section neither specifies
culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability,
recklessness is sufficient culpability . . . ."1" Ohio's statutes
exercise discretion and offer at least some direction to the courts
concerning the public welfare exception: strict liability is to be used
only in specific, special situations."
17 5 Id. at 888.
17 6 Id. at 890.
177 See State v. Arkell, 657 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
l7' State v. Arkell, 672 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Minn. 2003).
179 No. 14-02-02, 2002 WL 1434057 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. June 25, 2002)
18OId. at *1.
181Id.
182 Id.
183 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(b) (Anderson 2003).
"
t4 See id.
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Ohio's statutory discretion is typified by the child-support case
of State v. Collins. 11 5 There, the court "acknowledge [d] the convin-
cing public policy arguments presented by the state.. . in support
of the proposition that failure to follow a court-ordered child
support order should be a strict liability offense.""8 6 The court also
noted, however, that according to state law" 7 this could not be the
case unless there was "a plain indication in the statute of a legis-
lative purpose to impose strict criminal liability."' 8 The court in
Collins recognized the strong public policy arguments in favor of
conviction without mens rea in these circumstances.8 9 However,
the court also acknowledged that there are competing concerns and
that courts must use discretion when considering such drastic a
measure as eliminating the mens rea requirement.
Although Collins did not directly involve the environment, like
the statutory rape area 9 ° discussed above, the court's caution in
applying the public welfare exception is informative in the
environmental law context. If a state chooses to use the exception,
it should strive to emulate Ohio's statutory discretion.
C. Alabama
Alabama provides the same substantive safeguards as Ohio
when it invokes the public welfare exception. In Phillips v. State,191
the defendant violated a hunting statute'9 2 and "[hie was fined
$375 and his hunting privileges were revoked for one year." 93 This
is another example of a small, appropriate penalty for a public
welfare offense with no mens rea requirement.
Like Ohio, Alabama also exercises statutory discretion in its
use of the public welfare exception. In the strict liability hunting
185 733 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio 2000).
186 Id. at 1123.
18 7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(b) (Anderson 2003).
1s Collins, 733 N.E.2d at 1123.
189 Id.
190 See supra Part II.
19'771 So.2d 1061 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).
'
92ALA. CODE § 9-11-244 (Michie 2001).
19' Phillips, 771 So.2d at 1062.
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statute discussed above, the commentary following the statute
states:
Sometimes the ends accomplished, the evil or harm
sought to be regulated or prohibited, are deemed to
justify the means. As long as the kind and degree of
punishment is not disproportionate... strict liability
serves a useful, if not necessary, sanction, but such
statutory offenses should not be extended to impose
harsh criminal sanctions and stigma for nominal
crimes which any innocent man might commit.'
As in Ohio, the Alabama Legislature in its statutory law has
directed the judiciary to specifically take caution when applying
the public welfare exception.
D. Alaska
Alaska is a prime example of how a state should apply the
public welfare exception. State v. Hazelwood9 5 involved one of the
worst environmental catastrophes in recent memory, the Exxon-
Valdez incident. The court refused to allow strict liability under
the public welfare exception in the prosecution of Captain Hazel-
wood.' 96 The central issue was whether a "civil negligence" or a
"criminal negligence" mens rea requirement should be applied in
sentencing the defendant. 9 ' Although this Note focuses on the
imposition of strict liability, Hazelwood makes it clear that strict
liability is not always appropriate. 9 ' The court noted that it should
only be allowed where the "penalties are light,"'99 or where the
penalty is only "a modest fine,"200 which here it was not. In re-
194 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-3 (2004) (Commentary).
195 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997).
19 6Id. at 884.
197Id. at 877.
198 Id. at 880-84.
'
99Id. at 884.200Id. at 883.
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jecting strict liability, the Hazelwood court wrote: "Nevertheless,
we reject any rule that grants the legislature unbridled discretion
to impose strict liability crimes."2"' Although strict liability is
beneficial to prosecutors,20 2 Alaska rejected imposing strict liability
in one of the most publicized environmental disasters in history.
The court noted that " [s]trict liability cannot be applied simply to
expedite punishment when there is no reasonable expectation of
deterrence."2 °3 Even in the one case where Alaska could have
applied the public welfare exception to assign a high penalty, and
where the public would certainly have supported such a decision,
it refrained from doing so.
Alaska not only cautiously applies the public welfare exception
in the environmental law area, but in other areas as well, such as
securities fraud20 4 and statutory rape.20 5 In the securities fraud
case of Hentzer v. State, the court refused to apply the exception
because of an inordinate penalty.20 6 In the statutory rape case of
State v. Guest, the court again refused to apply the exception
because of an inordinate penalty, "unless a defense of reasonable
mistake of age is allowed."20 7 It thus permitted the defendant to
avoid a strict liability conviction.
Like Minnesota, Ohio, and Alabama, Alaska applies the pub-
lic welfare exception correctly, only allowing it when the penalties
are light and other concurrent policies are met. These four states
are positive models that the rest of the United States should
follow.
Although the public welfare exception should be entirely
eliminated,20 8 states have two options if they do not eliminate the
exception. First, they can attempt through state common law to
20 Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 882.
202 See supra Part I.
203 Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 884.
2 04 Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980).
205 State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
2 06 Hentzner, 613 P.2d at 826-27.
201 Guest, 583 P.2d at 838-39.
208 See supra Parts I-II, IV.
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apply the exception cautiously with regard to penalties. °9 Second,
states could define, through the implementation of statutes,
exactly what constitutes a permissible use of the exception when
assigning penalties.21 °
V. GENERAL PUBLIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Eliminating the mens rea requirement is not sound
environmental public policy. Although some states attempt to
apply the public welfare exception correctly, this is not the best
solution and cannot be the long-term answer. There is still simply
too much confusion surrounding its application.
As discussed throughout this Note, the central issue is
whether the public policy protecting the environment by making
convictions easier to obtain outweighs the public policy of merely
convicting and incarcerating culpable offenders.2 1' Historically,
this has been the delicate balance between the "arrival of the
industrial revolution"212 and its necessary "regulations,"213 and the
traditional view espoused by Blackstone that "[t]o constitute a
209 See Phillips v. State, 771 So.2d 1061 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); State v.
Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997); Hentzer v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 826-27
(Alaska 1980); State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978); State v. Arkell, 657
N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Bowersmith, No. 14-02-02, 2002 WL
1434057 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. June 25, 2002); State v. Collins, 733 N.E.2d 1118
(Ohio 2000). In each of these cases, the state courts were careful to use the
public welfare exception only when the penalties were small.
210 In the author's opinion, two separate, hypothetical statutory schemes are
possible: First, "No one may be convicted of a felony without the state proving
the requisite mens rea; strict liability may not be imposed to circumvent this
requirement." This would be ideal in that it would statutorily eliminate the
public welfare exception. Second, "No one may be sentenced to six months or
more imprisonment without the state proving the requisite mens rea; strict
liability may not be imposed to circumvent this requirement." This would
maintain the public welfare exception but keep penalties at an acceptable level.211 See supra Parts I-II.
212 Swanson, supra note 41, at 1265.
213Id. at 1268.
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crime against human laws, there must first be a vicious will and
secondly an unlawful act consequent upon such a vicious will."214
Even if the public welfare exception is not "singling out [indivi-
dual] wrongdoers for the purpose of punishment or correction, "215
but simply trying to protect the public and the environment, the
possibility still exists that, in the important process of protecting
the environment on the state level, individuals will in fact be
"punished."21 6 Various state environmental law and enforcement
regimes take advantage of the public welfare exception for a va-
riety of positive purposes.21 '7 The end of protecting the environment
is laudable, but the means create a dilemma.
This dilemma is rooted in the fundamental differences
between environmental and criminal law and the failure to
recognize such differences. David C. Fortney succinctly describes
these differences in his article, Environmental Criminal Law.218
"Environmental law is aspirational in the sense that it sets
enormously optimistic goals with the hope of forcing dramatic
changes in behavior in order to bring about substantial and rapid
change."21 9 It is "dynamic in the sense that it is constantly
changing in response to scientific discoveries. "22' For example, the
"Clean Air Act of 1970 mandated that the new (and ambitious)
214 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 21.
21 5 Shaw, supra note 8, at 344 (quoting Sayre, supra note 9, at 72).
216 See generally Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc., 830 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2003); State v. Mertens, 64 P.3d 633 (Wash. 2003); Flynn, supra note 11
(exemplifying how Pennsylvania, Washington, and Texas apply the exception
incorrectly with drastic penalties). See also United States v. Good, 257 F. Supp.
2d 1306 (D. Colo. 2003).
217 See Phillips v. State, 771 So.2d 1061 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (commercial
fishing); State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 880 (Alaska 1997) (oil discharge);
State v. Arkell, 657 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (building codes);
Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc., 830 A.2d 621 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (waste
transportation); State v. Bowersmith, No. 14-02-02, 2002 WL 1434057 (Ohio
App. 3 Dist. June 25, 2002) (hunting regulations); State v. Mertens, 64 P.3d 633
(Wash. 2003) (commercial fishing); Flynn, supra note 11 (oil discharge).218 David C. Fortney, Note, Thinking Outside the "Black Box": Tailored Enforce-
ment in Environmental Criminal Law, 81 TEX. L. REV 1609, 1621 (2003).2191Id. (emphasis in original).
220 Id. (emphasis in original).
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national air quality standards be met by 1975. "221 On the other
hand, Fortney notes, "criminal law relies heavily on stability and
notice.... Changes in the criminal law are generally made slowly,
and the overall framework has not changed dramatically in
hundreds of years. Because of this stability, criminals are assumed
to be on notice of what behavior will or will not be tolerated."
222
Attempting to morph these two areas of the law together is
bound to cause controversy and, as such, "[m] any critics contend
that basic differences between environmental and criminal law
render the two disciplines fundamentally incompatible."223 This
Note does not argue that the two disciplines must be completely
separate-there should in fact be criminal penalty aspects of
environmental laws. The implication of the differences between
these two areas of the law does not mean that there cannot be
common ground. However, what it does mean is that there must be
a large degree of discretion when implementing these penalties to
protect the environment. Placing a "dynamic"224 system's (en-
vironmental law) priorities on top of a static system (criminal law)
does not necessarily mean that the static system should be forced
to change its most fundamental structures. Instead it should
inform the "dynamic"225 system. Using bits and pieces of a static
system that has over time evolved a set series of elements in a
whimsical manner harms the integrity of both systems. The
importance of one public policy cannot simply cause policymakers
to disregard the other.
The traditional mens rea requirements226 must be respected.
As a matter of public policy, the rationale for using the public
welfare exception in the environmental criminal law area,
though strong, should not outweigh the traditional requirements
of criminal conviction. On the individual level, the penalty
221 Id.
222Id. at 1622.
223Id. at 1621.
224Fortney, supra note 218, at 1621.
225Sdt
226 See supra Part 1.
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requirement227 for the exception is often misapplied. 228 This cannot
adequately be solved by the discretion of judges and of
prosecutors.29 The potentially negative societal impacts on the
environment and insurance premiums cannot be ignored.23 ° If one
of the rationales for the exception is that the defendant "should
know"23' about regulations, negligence would be the more
appropriate standard.2"2 Although the exception is used in other
areas, that does not mean it should be used in the environmental
law area, because it is misapplied in those other areas as well.233
Finally, although it is applied correctly in a variety of states, 234 it
is applied just as incorrectly in other states, leading to a massive
amount of discord.235 Although making environmental law
enforcement easier is a positive end, and a correct application of
the exception by individual states is a positive means towards such
an end, the counter-balances cannot be ignored. The basic means
towards achieving this end ignore traditional criminal law theory
and, for each correct application of the exception at the state level,
an incorrect application can be found as well. For these reasons,
the exception should be disregarded in favor of the traditional
mens rea requirement.
CONCLUSION
The possibility that individuals such as David, the homeless
man in Texas "who had just worked his way up from being
homeless ... who volunteered to help a friend restore his car after
it was flooded in Tropical Storm Allison," and in the process
227 
Pd.228 See supra Part III.
229 See supra Part I.
230 Id.
231 State v. Arkell, 657 N.W.2d 883,887-88 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985)).232 See supra Part II.
23SId.
234 See supra Part IV.
215 See supra Part III.
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"spilled ... less than a quart of auto fluid,"236 could be sentenced
to twenty years in prison, 237 without regard to his state of mind, is
the potential effect of indiscriminately applying the public welfare
exception. Although this may seem like an overly dramatic, rare
example, the justice system cannot simply disregard such exam-
ples, even for a goal as worthwhile as protecting the environment.
2
.Flynn, supra note 11.23 7 Id.
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